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Abstract
What does David Hume do with the dialogue form in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion? I pursue this question in the context of a partial taxonomy of uses for dialogue in philosophy in general, and distinguish uses out of playfulness; for self-concealment; to tame opponents; for self-effacement; for causal operation; for self-discovery; and for dramatising a political ideal. I argue for Hume’s use of the last two, and investigate the expressions of selfhood and politics which these uses reveal in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: the self is multiple; sociable pleasure in company is more important than winning arguments or gaining knowledge.

Hume’s Uses of Dialogue

What does David Hume do with the dialogue form in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion? I pursue this question in the context of a partial taxonomy of uses for the dialogue form in philosophy in general—although I want to emphasise “partial.” My driving concern here is Hume, not a quixotic attempt to list all possible uses of dialogue or to draw conclusions about the uses of dialogue in philosophy in general.









And to begin, a deflationary reason: the use of dialogue is nothing more than writerly playfulness. A dialogue is a difficult and distinctive performance of skill: an ambitious philosopher might therefore write one just as display, as a poet might write a villanelle or a composer a string quartet; a confident philosopher might write a dialogue just for the fun of it. Now, considering the purely biographical question about Hume’s own intentions, he certainly was an ambitious and confident philosopher. In his short autobiography My Own Life he says, perhaps half jokingly, that his ruling passion was the desire for literary fame. He consciously took up and mastered several rhetorical and stylistic forms by emulating his idols: Addison & Steele of The Spectator; Cicero. He certainly enjoyed displaying that carefully-developed mastery. So I think this is a biographical reason for using the dialogue form, and it perhaps explains Pamphilus’s implausible conclusion that “I cannot but think that Philo’s principles are more probable than Demea’s, but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth” (DNR  12.34; 89): that’s a direct echo of Cicero’s conclusion to On the Nature of the Gods, and could be understood as Hume’s wink to fellow Tully fans and nothing more.





Another possible use: self-concealment, or at least distancing or plausible deniability. Perhaps Hume wants to disguise his own unpopular views—his suspected atheism—or at least to give himself an out when challenged: “it’s not me who says these disturbing things, it’s a character.” Richard Popkin, in the introduction to his edition of the Dialogues, suggests that “in considering how touchy religious subjects were at the time,” Hume “was able by means of the form to avoid stating his own views openly.”[3]

This is initially plausible. Self-concealment would have been prudent for Hume: to be openly an atheist, if that’s what he was, would have been at best to court notoriety and loathing, at worst to put himself at considerable personal risk—at least in early life, before he was wealthy and famous. And there are perhaps other examples of Hume distancing himself by speaking through characters: in the short dialogue usually printed as an appendix to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume attributes his most troubling thoughts about the cultural relativity of morals to “my friend, Palamedes.” (EPM A Dialogue 1; SBN 324) Or, for another example, section 11 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding begins: “I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes; where, though he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader.” (EHU 11.1; SBN 132)

It then gives that friend a speech in the character of Epicurus, so making a double distancing; which speech uses Hume’s own epistemology to attack the ideas of life after death and provident guidance of the world.

In general, this is perhaps sometimes what authors are doing with the dialogue form. But there are four problems with taking self-concealment as what Hume is doing in the Dialogues. First, there are easier and better ways to conceal oneself, if that’s what one wants. Why not publish anonymously, if it was in practice possible to be a really anonymous author in Hume’s social world? Second, writing through a character is unlikely to fool anyone. The boundary between use and mention is porous, and Hume’s enemies were never going to be satisfied with the “it’s just a character speaking” defence. Hume wrote the character, and his enemies could see as well as we can that the disturbing consequences being palmed off on that character follow from Hume’s own stated views in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Third, it’s not clear that Hume had a good reputation left to protect after the publication of “Of Miracles.” Fourth, Hume has no need to conceal himself: he deliberately didn’t release the Dialogues in his lifetime, instead making careful arrangements for its publication in his will.[4] Hume had nothing personally to lose in being as explicit and offensive as he chose to be, since he knew he’d be out of reach of retaliation—although he was also concerned about his friends, and tried to reassure his publisher William Strahan, for one, that there was nothing likely to cause trouble in the Dialogues.[5]





Perhaps Hume aims to tame his opponents by straw-manning them: in arguments as in chess, it’s easy to win if you play both sides. Writing a dialogue between your own mouthpiece and a safe version of your opponents is a way of winning—in your own head—a satisfying victory.

This is what happens in some philosophical dialogues: in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, for example.[6] But the Dialogues, unlike Three Dialogues, is a genuine dialogue. All three main speakers get some good points in and get to defend themselves; no-one is reduced to Hylas’s pathetic sequences of “yes,” “of course,” “no one can deny it,” “I have nothing to say to it,” and “you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed.” Demea is treated less well than the other two—he’s revealed as an authoritarian fool, and Philo gets to mock him quite a bit before he notices and storms off—but Cleanthes and Philo are well-matched. We have biographical evidence, in a letter from Hume to Gilbert Elliot, that Hume intended them to be equals, and went to considerable trouble to give each the strongest arguments available to him.[7]





So, perhaps Hume is doing the opposite of taming his opponents: perhaps he’s engaged in self-effacement. If one thought that the evidence, or the arguments, or the full expression of differing points of view, were more important than oneself as an author, one might write a dialogue precisely not to advocate one’s own view. 

For example, Cicero’s explicit purpose in On the Nature of the Gods is “to clear myself of any suspicion of partiality by presenting the views of the generality of philosophers concerning the nature of the gods,” and he claims that “those who seek my personal views on each issue are being unnecessarily inquisitive.”[8] It may be naïve to take Cicero at his word here. But the purpose is at least a recognisable one even if Cicero himself didn’t quite live up to it, and On the Nature of the Gods’ main historical importance is as a vector of transmission of Greek thought and philosophical terminology into Latin, not as an account of Cicero’s own views.[9]

For another example, John Perry, who has well-worked-out views of his own about the problem of personal identity, has also written A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality intended as an undergraduate textbook.[10] It does a good job of setting out several different views in contest with each other, but Perry’s author’s note says that “my aim has not been to explain and defend my own views on personal identity, but to introduce and develop positions and arguments that have emerged in the literature on that topic.” We might think analogously of formal scientific prose, or of Wikipedia’s neutrality policy.[11]

However: in the first place, Dialogues parts 2-11 aren’t just a compendium of views, but form an argument against knowledge of God. Philo argues much more strongly against Cleanthes than Cicero’s skeptic Cotta argues against his stoic Balbus. In the second place, self-effacement looks a non-starter in Hume’s case: as any reader of Hume knows, he’s intensely self-inscribing. He’s vitally a writer of character and individual personality, always loudly present in his own texts.

But then again, as I’ve already suggested, Hume isn’t always writer of his own character or his own individual personality. Hume loves to put on masks and perform characters, like the mysterious friends I mentioned while discussing self-concealment. It’s not always clear which characters are mouthpieces, which foils, which literary references or stylistic exercises. So, perhaps Hume is engaging in self-effacement not by removing personality, but by multiplying it: perhaps he’s hiding himself in a crowd.





According to Jonathan Dancy’s reading of the Dialogues, Hume intended to perform a non-rational operation on his readers’ psyches.[12] The Dialogues destabilises, rather than arguing against, the natural human tendency to make the move from apparent marks of design in the world to belief in a human-like designer-God (we might compare the natural human tendency to see faces everywhere, which is not defeated by our knowledge that there are no actual faces in clouds, cars, trees, etc.).

The first thing to do is to distinguish Dancy’s reading from the uncontroversial claims that texts have affective as well as rational powers, and that successful authors know how to use them. Dancy’s claim is the much more radical one that, in the Dialogues, affect—the causal operation—is all. That is: the appearance that Hume, or his characters, make rational arguments for conclusions, which Hume intends his readers to adopt, is a carefully-constructed illusion. The Dialogues is actually designed to be finally uninterpretable—to leave us with no stable or coherent idea about its author or his views—and for that instability to be contagious. It is supposed to spread to our attempts to get coherent ideas about the author of the world. The Dialogues as Dancy reads it is intended to defeat religious belief, not by reasoning anyone out of it—Hume doesn’t think that religious belief, or any belief, is reached purely by reasoning—but instead by working a-rationally on the believer to defeat her natural, equally a-rational tendency to see the world as authored.

There certainly are texts which are purely arational causal mechanisms. Advertising provides the obvious examples: think of Gillette adverts which juxtapose pictures of a man shaving with pictures of jet fighter aircraft. And perhaps there are philosophical texts, or texts which look philosophical on their surfaces, which are like that too. 

However, I don’t buy Dancy’s case for the Dialogues as such a text, for several reasons. First, if what you want is for your text to be religion-destroying a-rational mechanism, why pick the dialogue form, instead of some other more obviously causally effective genre? Why not heroic fiction, or setting one’s assertions to music, or juxtaposing them with images of manly power like jet fighter aircraft? Hume was a master at causing emotional complicity in his readers through narrative monologue, for example: that’s often how the arguments in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals work. Second, Dancy’s reading requires that the Dialogues is ultimately uninterpretable, but it isn’t. That claim is just my promise to offer an interpretation adequate to the text, which I’ll attempt below. Third, the analogy between the author of the Dialogues and the author of the world is weak, not least because, interpretable or not, the Dialogues does have a clearly identifiable author: his name is on the title page. Fourth, the required psychological mechanism of contagion of confusion about the author from text to world is obscure. Do we normally attribute to God what we interpret as the author of a text’s intentions? Do we ever do so?[13]

That fourth criticism could be countered by appealing to the widespread understanding of holy books as authored by God; the Quran, for example, is supposed to be the word of God reported to Muhammad by the angel Gabriel. Perhaps, then, the move from author-of-text to author-of-world isn’t so obscure. But, in the first place, the direction of association is importantly wrong here: the Quran is supposed to be a text authored by God, already assumed to be author of the world; the Dialogues is a text authored by David Hume, who has no claim to divinity. Examples of a move from world-creation to text-creation don’t show a tendency to move the other way. And in the second place, if Hume had wanted to exploit our habits of reading holy books, he could have made the Dialogues far more like them in style than it actually is: he could for example have written something more like Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, which gains some of its force by its parodic appropriation of the style of the gospels. That he didn’t make the stylistic connection suggests that he didn’t mean to make the author-text connection either. 

Dancy could also have appealed to Hume’s own association of the world with text, when, in part 3 of the Dialogues, Cleanthes imagines books appearing and reproducing naturally like animals and plants. But the point of Cleanthes’s “natural books” thought experiment is that the actual world bears marks of deliberate design at least as apparent as the imagined world filled with Illiads and Aeneids growing on trees would; the point is not to promote the authors of individual texts to divine status. It’s the library, not the single book, which is compared to the created world. There doesn’t seem to be enough here to support Dancy’s very large claim.

For these reasons, I don’t find Dancy’s causal operation reading convincing for the Dialogues, although I’m open to being convinced about other dialogues. However, I will return to what I take to be the important insight in Dancy’s reading in my Conclusion.





We could read the Dialogues as an autobiography: a reflexive attempt to uncover, record, and understand its author’s own self by exploring its structure and development.[14] But can an autobiography be multi-character and multivocal rather than monologic? We might object that autobiographies don’t normally set different parts of their author’s self against one another; we might even think that autobiographies must have unitary subjects.

But in the first place, there’s no such necessity: a fictional character’s self-discovery by self-multiplication is a recognisable literary trope, used in “The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde,” or Conrad’s “The Secret Sharer,” or Fight Club.[15] The technique is available to autobiographers, and it is used, for one example, by Robert Pirsig in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: Pirsig attempts to understand himself by separating his younger self as “Phaedrus”, and part of his point is that he can’t understand himself properly as a single person, that his life is marked by discontinuity between his lost, brilliant earlier incarnation and himself at the time of writing.[16]

In the second place, even if it’s unusual, autobiography by dialogue has the advantage of resisting the distorting pressure to satisfying narrative and coherence to which many single-voiced autobiographies willingly or unwillingly succumb.

In the third place, we can support, or at least further articulate, the idea of a multi-character autobiography using a reading of Hume’s own account of the self. That account has two parts: first, a skeptical argument, which uses Hume’s general theory of the nature and origin of ideas to argue that we have no idea of a self underlying and owning all our changing perceptions, ideas, memories and desires over time. Second, a more tentative account of how we nonetheless do have and use an idea of personal identity (an idea of which Hume makes considerable use in other parts of his work, for example in his theory of pride and his account of the virtue of justice). Hume says several things here, and it’s not clear how to fit them together into a coherent theory,[17] but one suggestion he makes is an analogy with the identity of nations: “I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation.” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261)

A minimal reading of this analogy would take only the point about causation: the identity over time of, say, Scotland, is a matter of causal connections between parts (members, laws, constitutions), not of the identity over time of a nation-soul underlying and owning those parts; similarly, the identity over time of David Hume is a matter of causal connections between parts (character, dispositions, impressions and ideas), not of the identity over time of a person-soul. We get the idea of an identical self over time by a natural tendency to conflate sufficiently gradual change with identity. (T 1.4.6.22; SBN 263)

A more ambitious and therefore more tentative reading makes more of the analogy between the parts of an individual and the citizens of a republic. The right pattern of causal connections between, and gradual change of, one group of parts, and of difference from other similarly internally connected groups, could give rise to ideas of multiple selves in ‘one’ person, by the same natural process of conflation. Just as we have ideas of Edinburgh and of Glasgow as distinct self-identical entities which are parts of Scotland, we might have ideas of different sequences of parts of David Hume as such entities.

I don’t mean definitely to attribute this view to Hume—the textual evidence for his theory of the self is notoriously inconclusive and contradictory—but I do think it’s worth exploring in relation to his use of dialogue. To be clear, my argument is not that Hume held this view of the self, and therefore that we should expect to find it expressed in Dialogues; rather, it’s that this view of the self helps us to defend the idea of an autobiography in dialogue form, and therefore to understand one use of that form. All texts are in a weak sense autobiographical, in that they deliberately or accidentally reveal their authors to some degree; the account of the self just sketched makes clearer the distinctive way in which a dialogue can reveal its author, and in which the Dialogues reveals Hume.

Perhaps, then, dialogue is a means of self-discovery by giving individual voices to the citizens of the republic of the self. We might compare the actor’s form of self-discovery: Orson Welles claims that “there is a villain in each of us, a murderer in each of us, a fascist in each of us, a saint in each of us, and the actor is the man or woman who can eliminate from himself those things which will interfere with that truth.”[18] The advantage of the script-writer, or the author of a philosophical dialogue, over the actor is that she doesn’t have to be just one of the characters, nor therefore have to eliminate the others.

On this reading, the use of dialogue for Hume is that it allows him to individuate his own different citizens, in two ways. First, individuation in time: each character in the Dialogues could represent a different stage in the development of Hume’s own thought. Pamphilus is the naive young Hume, Demea the priggish teenager who used to make up lists of virtues so he could rate himself against his classmates,[19] and so on. Second, individuation (as it were) in space, in the extent of the current self: Philo and Cleanthes, the skeptic and the natural theologian, are both parts of Hume, and their tensions aren’t to be subsumed in a finally unified self—like most people, Hume isn’t perfectly consistent or unified. As Walt Whitman said:

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)[20]

I think this is one important thing Hume is doing with the dialogue form in the Dialogues and perhaps elsewhere; but I think it doesn’t yet catch a further, political use of dialogue, and that’s what I want, finally, to consider.

Dramatisation of an ideal politics

Dialogues part 12 poses a problem of interpretation. At the end of part 11, Philo seems to have won the debate, Demea leaves in a huff, and the obvious conclusion to draw is that there are no arguments which produce knowledge of God’s nature. At best, in the absence of revelation, we ought to suspend judgement. But then in part 12 Philo performs a complete U-turn: he dismisses his own skeptical arguments as mere playful sophistry, says that of course Cleanthes’s argument from design for an anthropomorphic God is accepted by all reasonable people, and, even more oddly, suggests that “to be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian.” (DNR 12.33; 89) Pamphilus then closes the dialogue by announcing that Cleanthes’s views seem the most plausible. 

There is a long-standing argument in the philosophical and historical literature about what is going on here[21], but there is a straightforward reading available: Hume really does think—correctly or incorrectly—that where his argument ends is with Philo and Cleanthes not disagreeing about anything substantial. Philo is expressing Hume’s own view, and the U-turn is unproblematic. But this straighforward reading is unsatisfactory, for several reasons. 

In the first place, it ignores Hume’s decision to write a dialogue. The straightforward reading relies on a superficially appealing way of reading Dialogues, and especially part 12, which neglects that central decision: it may seem that Philo the skeptic is Hume’s mouthpiece. But asking of the Dialogues’ characters, Which one of these is Hume? is a mistake. The Dialogues is a play. Hume was a master at writing treatises and essays in a single voice, and had a deep concern for literary form and rhetorical strategy. The dialogue form he chose for this piece, unlike those pieces, is not accidental: the message is in the whole, in the interactions of all the characters, not in any one character. Shakespeare does not appear in his own person in Hamlet; there is no need to ask whether Rosencrantz or Guildenstern is Tom Stoppard; and it is similarly a mistake to expect Hume to be behind just one of the masks he adopts in the Dialogues.[22]

Having noticed that formal context, we can see that the straightforward reading also ignores the sudden, rhetorically showy, and deeply implausible dramatic character of Philo’s U-turn. Philo’s change of position is not the smooth and gradual result of careful back and forth with Cleanthes, it’s a jarring reversal. It’s performed using a great deal of flowery rhetoric of a kind much more characteristic of Cleanthes than of Philo in previous parts of the dialogue. And, perhaps most importantly, it’s argumentatively extremely weak: Philo’s earlier critical arguments clearly apply to his own statement of the argument from design just as well as they did to Cleanthes’s, and his claim that their dispute is merely verbal is perverse. Hume must mean to draw our attention to something here: Philo’s U-turn is a dramatic signal, not a sincere argument. It’s a Brechtian move which jars us out of identification with a character who (whether we agree with him or not) had previously seemed at least rational and therefore explicable, and into a more distanced, critical point of view on the drama as a whole.

An alternative and still fairly straightforward reading could be offered here: what Hume is drawing our attention to is the skeptic’s total victory over knowledge of God, by giving Philo obviously absurd lines intended to be read in a heavily sarcastic tone of voice. But this still doesn’t address the point that Dialogues is a play not a monologue, and it further ignores the multiple indications of political, rather than solely philosophical or argumentative intent in the Dialogues and in part 12 in particular. Hume’s apparent model for Dialogues, Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods,[23] is centrally concerned with what the different views of the nature of the gods teach us about the public duties we owe to them: “We should attend, investigate, and pass judgement on the views we are to hold on religion, divine observation, holiness, and religious ceremonial; on good faith and oath-taking; on temples and shrines and solemn sacrifice.”[24] Questions of education for public life run all through the Dialogues. Pamphilus is Cleanthes’s student, and Demea starts the conversation in part 1 by stating a theory of education: his purpose in teaching his children is to tame their minds “to a proper submission and self-diffidence” (DNR 1.2; 4) so that they will be ready to receive the religion he will eventually impart to them without the self-confidence or tools of rational defence. In general, the other characters are very aware of Pamphilus’s presence and of what example they’re setting him. The Dialogues adopts the political vocabulary of Hume’s explicitly political History of England, Natural History of Religion, and many of his essays on politics and religion: the vocabulary of superstition and enthusiasm, which Hume regards as mirror-image pathologies both of belief and of social action. In part 12 in particular, Philo and Cleanthes are concerned to describe the proper role of “true religion” (DNR 12, passim) in social and political life. The Dialogues is not just about what we can know about God or the gods: it’s also about how to live together with that knowledge, or its absence.

So, if we reject the straightforward readings in favour of claiming that the message of the dialogue is in the characters and their interaction, and that the topic is (at least partly) political, what political message is conveyed through the medium of the interacting characters in part 12 of the Dialogues? I want to make a conjecture, to be justified by its value in making sense of part 12 and of the Dialogues as a whole: Hume’s political message is the exemplary performance, and endorsement as ideal, of the life that his characters share, despite their disagreements. We should read Dialogues part 12 as a utopia—a dramatised ideal politics—in which Hume makes it vivid how the types represented by Philo and Cleanthes, but not by Demea, can live together.

To read part 12 as a utopia is to see three attempted operations in it. First, criticism by contrast: we are supposed to recognise that our own political life often falls short of the one dramatised, and condemn it where it does. Second, expansion of imagination: we are supposed to widen our understanding of what’s available to us, having seen a fictional version of it, at least in microcosm. Third, motivation: we should come to love and be moved to pursue the dramatised ideal.[25]

One could characterise the utopian politics of part 12 as toleration: rational or reasonable agreement not to enforce some of what one thinks most important, and to respect others’ views, which one thinks are wrong, about those most important things.[26] I don’t think that’s exactly mistaken, but I do think it’s incomplete, and the clue to its incompleteness is one of Pamphilus’s already-mentioned reasons for using the dialogue form: that it “unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life: study and society.” (DNR 0.4; 2) The toleration account, with its emphasis on mutual respect, misses the pleasure that Philo and Cleanthes take in their discussion and—more importantly—in each other’s company.

Cleanthes and Philo are friends: specifically, they are (at least) what Aristotle called pleasure friends, who delight in one another.[27] Philo is therefore happy to drop their disagreement and back down for the sake of that friendship and the pleasures it provides, and Cleanthes doesn’t object to his insincerity. He could quite properly have responded to the U-turn “don’t patronise me: you don’t believe that for a second,” but he goes along with the attempt to restore harmony instead. Philo’s U-turn and Cleanthes’s acceptance of it perform an endorsement of the relative value of friendship—the pleasures of society—over winning an argument or insisting on knowledge.[28]

Part 12, then, is a dramatisation of that view about their relative value: of political hedonism and political anti-rationalism; of the victory of passion over reason, and of society over solitary reasoning. Hume is, first, an anti-rationalist: belief, action, moral judgement, are all matters of passionate response—of delight and disgust, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion—rather than (only) reasoning. In politics as elsewhere, I claim, Hume thinks that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” (T 2.3.3.4; SBN 414-15) Hume is also, second, against solitude. This is not the trivial point that any politics is by definition non-solitary: it’s the substantive point that Hume condemns the politics of the monastery, a social organisation devoted to making as much space as possible for solitary prayer and meditation. For Hume, this and other social forms like it are politics devoted to vicious character, to the reproduction of the “gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast.” (EPM 9.3; SBN 270) The political lesson dramatised by part 12 is that knowledge and who is right are less important than taking pleasure in one another’s company. 





I have considered a range of possible uses of the dialogue form for Hume: out of writerly playfulness; for self-concealment; to tame his opponents; for self-effacement; to carry out a causal operation on his readers; for self-discovery; and for dramatising a political ideal. I have argued that the last two uses are particularly important. For Hume, in my view, the dialogue form is, first, a way of discovering and understanding himself as multiple, both over time and in his own current person, by individuating and giving voice to some of the citizens in his republic of the self; and, second, a way of dramatising and endorsing an anti-rationalist, hedonist, and anti-solitude politics in which reason is the slave of the passions, and especially the slave of the pleasure that friends take in one another’s company, regardless of whether they agree in their reasoning.

One final objection to my readings here is that if Hume intended to do all this with the Dialogues, he failed: no-one seems to have got the point (before Clark). My reply is to appeal to the central insight of Dancy’s causal reading, and to Hume’s anti-rationalism, and to say that it doesn’t much matter for Hume whether we his readers intellectually understand what he’s doing. What matters is how we’re changed by reading, and what we’re therefore motivated to do: if we come to accept ourselves as also multiple; if we come to value community over solitude or victory in argument; if Cleanthes-like natural theologians and Philo-like skeptics become better friends and better able to live together; if we come to mock or ignore Demea-like dogmatists and tyrants rather than taking them seriously; if we enjoy the pleasures of society and worry less about the correct account of our knowledge of God; then the Dialogues will have succeeded.
Versions of this paper were given at the Dialogues in Philosophy Workshop, Lancaster University, UK, 20-21 September 2012, and at a work in progress session with my colleagues at Lancaster, 14 November 2012. I want to thank participants in both events for their kind attention and helpful comments. I also want to thank two anonymous referees, and the editors of Hume Studies, for their careful and valuable comments on the originally-submitted version.

1. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is here cited in the version edited by Richard Popkin (2nd edn, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).

2. David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis, “Holes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1970): 206-212.

3. Popkin, Editor’s Introduction, ix. 

4. On which see 591-3 of Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) and Appendix C of Norman Kemp Smith’s edition of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).

5. Letter of June 1776 in in J. Y. T. Greig ed., The Letters of David Hume (2 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 2: 322-4.

6. George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (various editions, first published 1713).

7. Letter of 10 March 1751, in Greig ed., Letters, 1: 153-5. On what we can conclude about Hume’s own views from this letter—very little—see Peter Dendle, “A Note on Hume’s Letter to Gilbert Elliot,” Hume Studies 20 (1994): 289-91.

8. Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Nature of the Gods trans. P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 7, 6.

9. I make no claim to expertise here, and thank Gillian Clark for sharing hers.

10. John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).

11. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view, accessed 27 September 2013.

12. Jonathan Dancy, “‘For Here the Author is Annihilated’: Reflections on Philosophical Aspects of the Use of the Dialogue Form in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,” Proceedings of the British Academy 85 (1995): 29-60.

13. Martin Bell offers further critique of Dancy from a historical point of view in “The Relation between Literary Form and Philosophical Argument in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,” Hume Studies 27 (2001): 227-46.

14. This suggestion is also made, though to rather different purposes, by John O. Nelson, “The Role of Part XII in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,” Hume Studies 14 (1988): 347-72. I discuss autobiographical self-examination in general and in other authors in Samuel Clark, “Love, Poetry, and the Good Life: Mill’s Autobiography and Perfectionist Ethics,” Inquiry 53 (2010): 565-578; Samuel Clark, “Pleasure as Self-Discovery,” Ratio 25 (2012): 260-276; and Samuel Clark, “Under the Mountain: Individuality, Basic Training, and Comradeship,” Res Publica 19 (2013): 67-79.

15. Robert Louis Stevenson, “The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde” (various editions, first published 1886); Joseph Conrad, “The Secret Sharer” (various editions, first published 1910); David Fincher dir., Fight Club (20th Century Fox 1999).

16. Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (London: The Bodley Head, 1974).

17. The difficulty of doing so can be gestured at by noting the variety of recent attempts and discussions, which include: Donald L. M. Baxter, “Hume’s Labyrinth: Concerning the Idea of Personal Identity,” Hume Studies 24 (1998): 203-233. Michael J. Green, “The Idea of a Momentary Self and Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 103-122. Robert S. Henderson, “David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions,” Hume Studies 16 (1990): 33-44. Louis E. Loeb, “Causation, Extrinsic Relations, and Hume’s Second Thoughts about Personal Identity,” Hume Studies 18 (1992): 219-31. David Pears, “Hume’s Recantation of His Theory of Personal Identity,” Hume Studies 30 (2004): 257-64. Abraham Sesshu Roth, “What was Hume’s Problem with Personal Identity?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 91-114. Paul Russell, “Faith, Skepticism & Personal Identity,” Hume Studies 21 (1995): 351-4. Galen Strawson, The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity From Descartes to Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), part 6. Wayne Waxman, “Hume’s Quandary Concerning Personal Identity,” Hume Studies 18 (1992): 233-53.





20. Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” in Jerome Loving ed., Leaves of Grass (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990): 29-79, 78.

21. For example: William Austin, “Philo’s Reversal,” Philosophical Topics 13 (1985): 103-12. John Bricke, “On the Interpretation of Hume’s Dialogues,” Religious Studies 11 (1975): 1-18. Scott Davis, “Irony and Argument in Dialogues XII,” Religious Studies 27 (1991): 239-57. Richard Dees, “Morality above Metaphysics: Friendship and Philo’s Stance in Dialogues XII,” Hume Studies 28 (2002): 131-47. John O. Nelson, “The Role of Part XII in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,” Hume Studies 14 (1988): 347-72. A. G. Vink, “Philo’s Final Conclusion in Hume’s Dialogues,” Religious Studies 25 (1989): 489-99.

22. This paragraph draws on Samuel Clark, “No Abiding City: Hume, Naturalism, and Toleration,” Philosophy 84 (2009): 75-94.





25. I draw on Samuel Clark, Living Without Domination: The Possibility of an Anarchist Utopia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) for this characteristation of the work of utopian texts.

26. I offer this reading in Clark, “No Abiding City”.

27. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (various editions), book 8.

28. Dees, “Morality above Metaphysics,” similarly reads part 12 as being about friendship, but he takes Hume’s point to be about the necessity of etiquette in common life, rather than about politics.





2



